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A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE FUTURE OF 
MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES 
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG::-
History and tradition have emerged, together, as contemporary 
flagship arguments for limiting marriage to different-sex couples. 1 
According to advocates of "traditional marriage," same-sex couples can be 
excluded from marriage today because marriage always has been reserved 
to male-female couples.2 Further, some contend, the restriction of marriage 
to different-sex couples has long been understood as necessary to provide 
channels to control naturally procreative (i.e., male-female) relationships? 
• Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Newark. My thanks for 
contributions to the attached amicus brief to the history and family law scholars on whose 
behalfthe attached brief was filed, Susan Sommer at Lambda Legal Defense, the cooperating 
attorneys at Arnold & Porter, and Henry Monaghan. Additional thanks to Todd Anten for 
outstanding research assistance. 
1 Arguments related to the well-being of children, which also feature prominently 
in litigation and the public debate, will be set aside here, as the brief that follows this 
introduction focuses on history and tradition. For amicus briefs related to children's best 
interests claims, see, for example, Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological 
Association et aL in Support of Plaintiffs-Respondents, Hernandez v. Robles, 2005 N.Y. Slip 
Op. 09436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't Dec. 8, 2005) (No. 103434/04); Brief Amicus Curiae 
of the Massachusetts Psychiatric Society et aI., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860). Many of the amicus briefs cited in this essay can 
be found on the websites of the organizations litigating challenges to marriage laws on 
behalf of lesbian and gay couples. See, e.g., http://www.aclu.orgllgbtlindex.htrnl; 
http://glad.orgiGLAD_Casesl#marriage_&_civil_ unions; http://wwwJambdalegal.org; 
http://www.nclrights.orgl. 
2 See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 55, Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (No. A-2244-03T5) ("Plaintiffs' desire to enter into a same-
sex marriage sets them apart from the historic understanding of the institution of marriage."); 
see also Hernandez v. Robles, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 09436, at *9, (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 
Dec. 8, 2005) (objecting to lower court's validation of same-sex couples' right to marry on 
grounds that it "redefin[ed] traditional marriage"); Lewis, 875 A.2d at 270 (describing the 
State's opposition to same-sex marriage as "grounded on historical tradition"); Shields v. 
Madigan, 5 Misc. 3d 901, 903 (NY. Rockland Cty. 2004) (characterizing the State's 
argument to be that New York's marriage statute "embodies the well-recognized historical 
tradition of opposite-sex marriage in our culture"). 
3 See, e.g., Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("The 
differentiation between opposite-sex and same-sex couples in Indiana marriage law is based 
on inherent differences reasonably and rationally distinguishing the two classes: the ability to 
procreate 'naturally."'); Appellant's Brief at 45-46, Hernandez, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 09436 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't Dec. 8, 2005) (No. 103434/04) (arguing that "the State could 
HeinOnline -- 15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 250 2006
250 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol. 15:1 
However popular these claims might be in op-ed pieces and on talk 
radio, when they are made in the litigation context, the question is not 
whether they have rhetorical appeal but rather whether they can explain the 
State's different marriage rules for gay and non-gay couples. For this 
purpose, broad-brush invocations of marriage's history will not suffice. 
Yet, it is precisely these sorts of superficial references to tradition 
that have captivated courts deciding a variety of challenges to marriage 
restrictions. Pick a case that touches on marriage from federal or state court, 
from the nineteenth or twentieth century, and there is a reasonable chance 
that marriage will be described as a fixed, transhistorical institution that is 
foundational to civilization. Typical is the assertion of the Supreme Court in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, the first case to identify marriage as a fundamental 
right: "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.'>4 
A cohort of more recent cases that specifically address marriage 
laws' exclusion of gay and lesbian couples follows this course. Courts in 
New York, New Jersey, and Arizona, among others, have rejected 
constitutional challenges brought by gay and lesbian couples on the grounds 
that the different-sex couple requirement has long been a part of the state's 
. I 5 mamage aw. 
detennine that it is important to encourage opposite-sex couples to marry to establish long-
term relationships given the financial and legal obligations parents bear for their children"). 
4316 U.S. 535,541 (1942); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential 
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,211 (1888) 
(describing marriage as "an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is 
deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there 
would be neither civilization nor progress"). 
5 See, e.g., Hernandez, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 09436, at *10 (Catterson, J., concurring) 
("The concept of marriage has traditionally been accepted by courts throughout the United 
States as the union of a man and a woman. Any change in that frequently articulated 
heterosexual construct would be a revolution in the law rather than evolution."); Lewis, 875 
A.2d at 264 (concluding that "marriage between members of the same sex has no historical 
foundation or contemporary societal acceptance and therefore is not constitutionally 
mandated"); Standhart v. Sup. Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) ("The history of 
the law's treatment of marriage as an institution involving one man and one woman, together 
with recent, explicit reaffirmations of that view, lead invariably to the conclusion that the 
right to enter a same-sex marriage is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by due 
process."); Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, No. 1967-04, at 7 (N.Y. Albany Cty. Dec. 
7,2004) (validating New York's discriminatory marriage rule on its view of the "historical, 
legal, and cultural understanding of marriage"); Shields,S Misc. 3d at 907 ("[P]reserving the 
institution of marriage for opposite-sex couples serves the valid public purpose of preserving 
the historic institution of marriage as a union of man and woman .... "); see also Jones v. 
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) ("In all cases, ... marriage has always been 
considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have been presented with no authority 
to the contrary."); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) ("The institution of 
marriage as a union of man and woman ... is as old as the book of Genesis."). 
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This glib treatment of marriage as historically static and at risk of 
disintegration should same-sex couples be permitted to marry has caused 
considerable frustration among scholars of history and family law. There is, 
of course, the general point, which the Supreme Court has endorsed 
repeatedly, that history alone cannot justify retention of discriminatory 
rules.6 More significant, however, is the reliance on an inaccurate history of 
marriage. This history, it turns out, contradicts directly the argument that 
marriage has a set of fixed, unchangeable criteria that represent its essence, 
including the different-sex restriction at issue in the contemporary marriage 
litigation. 
In fact, marriage has undergone near-constant evolution to the point 
that marriage today bears little resemblance to marriage in the past. One 
hundred fifty years ago, a woman lost virtually all of her independent legal 
identity upon marriage. Even fifty years ago, in numerous jurisdictions, 
access to divorce was extremely limited, rape within marriage was not a 
crime, and bans on interracial marriage remained in force. The real history 
of marriage is thus an extended and consistent account of change to 
elements of marriage once considered essential. 7 
Because misconceptions of marriage's history have played such an 
important part in justifying the male-female marriage eligibility requirement, 
history and family law scholars have become part of the fabric of the 
litigation over the rights of same-sex couples to marry. In most of the major 
marriage cases across the country, these scholars have filed briefs to make 
the basic, yet critical, point that history does not bear out the claim that 
rules of marriage that were considered fundamental in the past should 
survive challenge by virtue of their vintage. 8 
6 See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) ("'[N]either the 
antiquity of a practice nor the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through 
the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack .... "') (alteration in original) (quoting 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970)); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 
(1983) ("Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of 
constitutional guarantees .... "); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) ("It is 
obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the 
Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence 
and indeed predates it."). 
7 See Hernandez, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 483 (N.Y. Cty. 2005) (observing that "the 
concept of marriage has steadily evolved beyond a rigid static 'historical' definition"), rev'd, 
2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 09436, at *29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't Dec. 8, 2005) (Saxe, J., 
dissenting) ("The common understanding of the term marriage has not always been what it is 
today. The institution of marriage has changed remarkably over the centuries .... [The] 
long-accepted assumptions that once defined marriage have eroded."). 
8 See, e.g., Brief of Professors of History and Family Law as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Respondents, Hernandez, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 09436 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1 st Dep't Dec. 8, 2005) (No.1 03434/04); Brief of the Professors of the History of Marriage, 
Families, and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of PlaintiffS-Appellants, Lewis v. Harris, 
No. A-2244-03T5 (N.J. Oct. 6, 2005); Brief Amici Curiae of History Scholars, Andersen v. 
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The brief that follows this essay, which was filed in New York's 
appellate court, does this work by demythologizing the history of marriage 
in New York. It shows that the elements of marriage in New York-
including those once thought essential, such as husbands' control over their 
wives in myriad respects-always have been subject to change. Further, the 
amici argue, these changes, over time, have rendered the exclusion of same-
sex couples from legal marriage an anachronism. 
In addition to charting the changes in the legal independence of 
women within marriage, the historians provide important context for 
thinking about-and rebutting-the received wisdom that marriage and 
procreation always have been and always will be linked. As case law and 
the relevant statutory framework make clear, while sexual intercourse has 
sometimes been deemed essential to marriage,9 procreation has not. The 
cases with the strongest dicta suggesting a historically grounded link 
between the two turn out not to concern procreation at all. 10 Moreover, 
many courts explicitly have rejected petitions to annul a marriage because 
of a spouse's inability or unwillingrIess to procreate. I I 
A review of the history of marriage also reveals the exclusion of 
same-sex couples to be an outgrowth of an earlier, since-abandoned view 
that the State had a legitimate interest in policing gender roles in marriage. 
The shift away from sex-based regulation of marriage can be seen not only 
in the demise of coverture but also in the judicial and legislative 
invalidation of many more recent rules that reinforced different roles for 
husbands and wives. These rules, which once were considered fundamental 
but since have been rejected, provide for, inter alia, imposition of greater 
liability for marital household expenses on husbands than wives, 12 
availability of loss of consortium claims to husbands but not wives,13 and 
favoritism for mothers (or fathers) for child custody.14 With the sex-based 
King County, No. 75934-1 (Wash. Feb. 7,2005); Amici Curiae Brief of the Professors of the 
History of Marriage, Families, and the Law, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860). 
9 See, e.g., Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 210 (I 960) (stating that "a refusal to 
have marital sexual relations undermines the essential structure of marriage"); T. v. M., 242 
A.2d 670, 674 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968) (holding that impotence is a ground for 
annulling a marriage); see also Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State 
Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REv 1089 (2002). 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 79-86. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 87-92. 
12 See infra Part 1I1.A.2.c. 
13 See infra Part 1I1.A.2.b. 
14 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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distinctions now gone, there is nothing left in marriage law that 
distinguishes between the roles of male and female spouses. From a 
historical standpoint, then, invalidation-rather than retention--of the 
different-sex marriage eligibility rule would be more consistent with the 
trajectory of history. IS 
Ultimately, an accurate telling of marriage's history directly 
addresses the fear fanned by adversaries of marriage equality: that 
marriage-and civilization-will crumble if gay and lesbian couples are 
permitted to marry. By providing a longer and broader context for 
understanding the evolution of marriage in New York, the historical 
account offered in the brief shows that invalidation of the different-sex 
marriage eligibility rule, while considered trans formative by some, will do 
little to change the essence of marriage. After all, at its core, marriage in 
New York (and elsewhere) always has been concerned primarily with the 
marital partners' interdependence. This focus on interdependence has 
remained even as conceptions of spouses' mutually supportive roles have 
evolved and traditional marriage rules related to those roles have been 
invalidated. If history is any guide, marriage also will survive the change 
sought now by same-sex couples, should it occur, just as it has survived so 
many changes over time. 
15 In this light, the State's insistence on maintaining a different-sex rule for 
marriage eligibility can be seen as a last-ditch effort to maintain a gendered distinction in the 
roles of spouses within marriage. This instinct to preserve sex roles has not been articulated 
explicitly, presumably because much constitutional doctrine makes clear that sex stereotypes 
may not be the basis for government action. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
549-50 (1996) (rejecting the State's judgment of what is appropriate for "most women" as 
unconstitutional sex stereotyping); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (rejecting sex 
stereotyping as unconstitutional in exercise of jury peremptory challenges). 
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t In publishing this brief, the Columbia Journal of Gender & Law has made no 
editorial changes other than adjusting the format and citations to conform with THE 
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th 
ed.2005). 
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I. INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
We are professors of history and family law specializing in the 
history of marriage, families, and the law, at universities throughout the 
United States. We have written leading books and articles analyzing the 
history of marriage and marriage law in the United States. This brief is 
submitted to assist the Court's deliberations by offering an analysis of the 
history of marriage law and practice based on our scholarship. Our names, 
institutional affiliations, and brief biographies are set out in Exhibit E to 
AffIrmation of Suzanne B. Goldberg in Support of Permission to File a 
Brief as Amici Curiae (July 28, 2005). 
We adopt the Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts in the 
brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
ll. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The history of marriage in New York is a history of change. Since 
the State's earliest days, marriage has undergone continuous reexamination 
and revision. Indeed, marriage today-a partnership between two adults 
who are equal in the eyes of the law-bears little resemblance to marriage 
as it existed at the State's founding or even a few decades ago. 
The relevant history demonstrates that all marriage rules remain 
subject to meaningful judicial review and that a rule's vintage is not, by 
itself, suffIcient justification for its retention. Indeed, the historical record 
specifically documents the transformation or invalidation of many 
traditional features of marriage. 
The historical record shows, as well, that New York has invalidated 
rules requiring different treatment of men and women in marriage, and that 
the State has never treated procreation as essential to marriage. Moreover, 
throughout its statehood, New York has not maintained uniformity between 
its marriage rules and those of other states. 
Further, the ongoing evolution of marriage throughout New York's 
history renders implausible the suggestion that marriage, which has 
survived so many changes, is too frail to endure the constitutionally 
compelled revision of the anachronistic different-sex eligibility rule. To the 
contrary, the State continues to recognize a substantial set of rights and 
responsibilities of couples as "marriage," even as that set has shed elements 
that were considered fundamental to marriage earlier in our history. Nor 
have the changes to marriage deterred New Yorkers, who continue to 
embrace marriage overwhelmingly as the mechanism for achieving state 
recognition of their relationships. Even in the wake of significant 
transformation, marriage has survived, all the while remaining true to its 
core purpose of recognizing committed, interdependent partnerships 
between consenting adults. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Legal Definition of Marriage in New York Has Never Been 
Static; Features of Marriage Once Thought Essential Have Been 
Revisited and Rejected Consistently Over Time. 
In finding that marriage "is not a stagnant institution" and that 
many longstanding and once-fundamental marriage rules. have been 
invalidated, the court below recognized correctly that the history of the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage describes but does not explain 
or justify the continuation of that rule. I As legal developments throughout 
New York's history demonstrate, the State's courts and legislature have 
continuously adjusted and abandoned elements once thought to represent 
the foundations of marriage. 
1. The Shift Away From the Common Law Coverture Regime 
Transformed the Meaning of Marriage in New York in the Nineteenth 
and Early Twentieth Centuries. 
Until well into the nineteenth century, marriage in New York meant 
the complete merger of a woman's legal identity into that of her husband. 
Indeed, for most people, marriage was unimaginable in any other way.2 As 
I See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 488, 489-90 (N.Y. Cty. 2005). Several 
courts in New York have missed this important distinction between history as descriptive 
and history as a justification for discrimination. See, e.g., Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep't of 
Health, No. 1967-04, at 7 (Albany Cty. Dec. 7, 2004) (resting its validation of the 
discriminatory marriage rule on its view of the "historical, legal, and cultural understanding 
of marriage"); Shields v. Madigan, 5 Misc. 3d 901, 907 (Rockland Cty. 2004) (holding that 
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage "serves the valid public purpose of 
preserving the historic institution of marriage as a union of man and woman"). 
The City likewise mistakenly equates the historical exclusion of same-sex couples 
with the essence of marriage. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 30 (maintaining that history does 
not "conferO the status of 'fundamental right' on same-sex marriage"). 
2 Religious tradition and civil law both shaped early models of marriage. See 
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERlCA 65-66 (\ 985) (observing shifts in the treatment of marriage as a 
sacrament). However, New York's government, since colonial times, has overseen marriage 
as a civil institution rather than a religious contract. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,212 
(1888), citing Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N.Y. 282 (\ 874) ("The general statute ... declares 
[marriage] a civil contract, as distinguished from a religious sacrament."). 
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the Court for Correction of Errors put it in 1830/ "the wife ... and her 
husband constitute but one person. ,,4 
For both men and women, negating a married woman's 
independent legal capacity, including her capacity to own property in her 
own right, was understood as one of marriage's indispensable elements. As 
the Supreme Court of Judicature wrote in 1824, "a husband, in virtue of his 
marriage, becomes absolute owner of the goods and chattels of his wife.,,5 
The collapse of women's legal identity upon marriage extended to 
wives' ability to contract as well. As the Supreme Court of Judicature 
observed in 1819, "[i]t is a settled principle of the common law, that 
coverture disqualifies a feme from entering into a contract or covenant, 
personally binding upon her.'.6 Husbands' control over their wives meant, 
too, that women had limited recourse in response to "restraint" by their 
husbands.? 
This gendered concept of marriage reflected in coverture emerged 
from the view that the colonial family was a "little commonwealth" whose 
members were bound together by a well-defined set of reciprocal duties and 
the shared aims of domestic tranquility. 8 The husband was, by legal 
entitlement and informal social code, the "governor" of this colonial 
3 As this Court is aware, from early statehood through 1847, the State had two high 
courts: the Court for the Correction of Errors (N.Y.) and the Court of Chancery (N.Y. Ch.). 
WILLIAM H. MANZ, GIBSON'S NEW YORK LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE 116-17 (3d ed. 2004). The 
Supreme Court of Judicature (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) functioned as an intermediate appellate court 
from 1821-1847. [d. 
4 Martin v. Dwelly, 6 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1830); see also People ex reI. Barry v. 
Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) ("The very being or legal existence of the 
woman is suspended during the marriage, or, at least, is incorporated and consolidated into 
that of the husband.") (citation omitted); NANCY F. Corr, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF 
MARRlAGE AND THE NATION 11-12 (2000) (describing the sudden change in a woman's rights 
upon marriage under the coverture regime). 
5 Udall v. Kenney, 3 Cow. 590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); see also Barber v. Harris, 15 
Wend. 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) ("[D]uring the life of the husband, he undoubtedly has the 
absolute control of the estate of the wife, and can conveyor mortgage it for that period."). 
6 Jackson ex demo Clowes v. Vanderheyden, 17 Johns. 167, 169 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1819); see also Wood v. Genet, 8 Paige Ch. 137 (N.Y. Ch. 1840) ("[I]t is perfectly well 
settled that a feme covert cannot bind herself, personally, by any contract or 
agreement .... "). 
7 Mercein, 3 Hill at 408 ("[T]he courts of law will still permit the husband to 
restrain the wife of her liberty in case of any gross misbehavior."); see also Reva B. Siegel, 
"The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2123 
(1996) (explaining the common law view that since a husband was legally liable for his 
wife's misbehavior, he also possessed the power to "restrain" her). 
8 GROSSBERG, supra note 2, at 5 (citation omitted). 
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household. 9 The wife and children, in turn, were dependents within the 
husband's domain. 10 
Against this background, a woman's "civil death" upon marriage 
was seen as both natural and essential to the healthy continuation of 
marriage and the broader society. 11 As the Supreme Court of Judicature 
explained in 1820, "no man of wisdom and reflection can doubt the 
propriety of the rule, which gives to the husband the control and custody of 
the wife."J2 "[T]his socially constructed rule [of unity] was identified as 
part of 'the natural order of things. ",13 Consequently, coverture was also 
seen as necessary "to preserve the harmony of the marriage relationship.,,14 
But by the middle nineteenth century, the institution of marriage 
had changed considerably. Marriage no longer meant the absolute legal 
subordination of women to their husbands. In 1848, New York became one 
of the first states in the country to authorize married women to own 
property as independent individuals. IS The Act provided in part: 
The real and personal property of any female who may hereafter 
marry, and which she shall own at the time of marriage, and the 
rents issues and profits thereof shall not be subject to the disposal 
of her husband, nor be liable for his debts, and shall continue her 
sole and separate property, as if she were a single female. 16 
JO See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE 
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 6-14 (1994) (discussing colonial parents' 
rights and responsibilities). 
11 See PEGGY A. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
FEMALE EMANCIPATION 19 (1980) (discussing married women's legal status in New York 
prior to 1848). 
12 Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Johns. 548,584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820). 
13 Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the History of Divorce 
Law Reform in New York State, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 375, 392 (1988) (citation omitted); see also 
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN & WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 102-03 (2000) (describing the 
nineteenth century's perception of coverture "as a simple and sincere expression of human 
natures," and "based on unchanging scriptural truth"). 
14 Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947, 996 (2002). 
15 Doris Jonas Freed et aI., Married Women's Rights, N.Y.L.1., Feb. 26, 1991, at 3. 
16 Act of April 7, 1848, ch. 200 § 1, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307. 
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The following year, the Act was amended to provide married women with 
the power to contract as well. I7 
Not surprisingly, the opponents of these changes proclaimed that 
removing the husband from his role as the "ultimate locus of power within 
the home" would lead to domestic chaos and the destruction of the nation. 18 
In 1844, for example, a New York State legislative committee observed 
"that allowing married women to control their own property would lead 'to 
infidelity in the marriage bed, a high rate of divorce, and increased female 
criminality,' while turning marriage from 'its high and holy purposes' into 
something arranged for 'convenience and sensuality. ",19 A prominent New 
York lawyer opposed the Act out of similar fears that women's independent 
property ownership would lead "husband and wife [to] become armed 
against each other to the utter destruction of the sentiments which they 
should entertain towards each other, and to the utter subversion of true 
felicity in married life.,,20 
Despite these concerns, the element of legal unity of spouses, which 
had been thought of as essential to marriage since statehood, continued to 
change throughout the 1850s and 1860s through a stream of legislative acts 
and judicial decisions. These changes included statutes protecting married 
women's savings deposits/I ensuring married women the right to vote as 
stockholders in elections,22 and protecting a woman's right to sue and be 
sued23 and to keep her earnings during marriage (the "Earnings Act"). 24 
Reflecting New York's leadership role in altering the meaning of marriage, 
17 Act of April 11, 1849, ch.375 §§ 3-4, 1849 N.Y. Laws 528 (authorizing a 
married woman "to convey and devise real and personal property... as if she were 
unmarried"). 
18 GROSSBERG, supra note 2, at 282. 
19 E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? THE STRANGE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OUR 
MOST INTIMATE INSTITUTION 30-31 (1999). 
20 RABKIN, supra note 11, at 95 (quoting G. BISHOP & W. AlTREE, REpORT OF THE 
DEBATES AND PROCEDURES OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 18461057 (1846)). 
21 Act of March 25,1850, ch. 91,1850 N.Y. Laws 142. 
22 Law of June 30, 1851, ch. 321, 1851 N.Y. Laws 616. 
23 The provisions of the Earnings Act allowing women to sue and be sued were 
repealed in 1880 and then reinstated a decade later. Joseph A. Ranney, Anglicans. Merchants. 
and Feminists: A Comparative Study of the Evolution of Married Women's Rights in 
Virginia. New York. and Wisconsin, 6 WM. & MARY 1. WOMEN & L. 493, 528-29 (2000). 
24 Act of March 20,1860, ch. 90, 1860 N.Y. Laws 157. 
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the Earnings Act has been described as arguably the nation's "boldest" 
legislation on behalf of married women's legal rights?5 
Courts played a significant role in determining the elements of 
marriage. At first, for example, they adhered to the previously settled view 
that married women were limited in their ability to contract. 26 By 1908, 
however, the Court of Appeals rejected that position: "Courts of law now 
recognize the separate existence of a husband and his wife the same as 
courts of equity and give to each the same rights and remedies.,,27 
New York's courts likewise eroded earlier rules limiting wives' 
ability to sue in tort. Traditional requirements that a husband be joined to 
any tort action against a married woman were rejected. 28 Similarly, the 
State's high court recognized a married woman's right to sue third parties 
for personal tortS.29 
By 1923, New York courts not only had rejected the traditional 
understanding of marriage as coverture but also had characterized as 
"archaic" the common law understanding that a husband "had a property 
interest in [his wife's] body and a right to the personal enjoyment of his 
wife.,,30 In setting aside the different rules for husbands and wives regarding 
claims of criminal conversation, the Court pointedly observed that the only 
objection to the wife's claim had been "the plea that the ancient law did not 
give it to her.,,3) "Reverence for antiquity," however, "demands no such 
denial," the Court wrote. 32 Instead, "[ c ]ourts exist for the purpose of 
ameliorating the harshness of ancient laws inconsistent with modern 
progress when it can be done without interfering with vested rights.,,33 
25 NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTIJRY NEW YORK 28 (1982). 
26 See, e.g., Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N.Y. 152, 160 (1883) (holding that "[t]he ability 
of the wife to make contracts is limited"). 
27 Winter v. Winter, 191 N.Y. 462, 475 (1908). 
28 Compare Bertles, 92 N.Y. at 161 (stating that "the common-law rule as to the 
liability of the husband for the torts and crimes of his wife are still substantially in force"), 
with Quilty v. Battie, 135 N.Y. 201, 209 (1892) (finding that a husband was "not a proper 
party defendant" in a case against the wife for "a trespass committed by her in the care and 
management of her separate estate"). 
29 See Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 590 (1889) (holding that a married 
woman had the same legal capacity as her husband to bring suit at common law for 
alienation of affections). 
30 Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 161 (1923). 
31 !d. at 165. 
32 !d. 
33 !d. 
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2. Since the Mid-Twentieth Century, New York Has Continued To 
Change Elements of Marriage Once Considered Unalterable. 
261 
Having endured the transformations just described, marriage neither 
collapsed as a legal or social entity nor became so immutably fixed as to 
ward off further evolution. To the contrary, changes to what once had been 
thought of as "core" elements of marriage continued. These changes 
reshaped, inter alia, rules regarding interspousal immunity, spousal 
testimonial privilege, the doctrine of necessaries, loss of consortium, and 
sexual relations between spouses. Both individually and together, these 
shifts demonstrate, again, that the law governing marriage has been and 
continues to be in a constant state of change, reflecting the imperatives of a 
changing social order.34 
a. Interspousal Immunity and Spousal Testimonial Privilege 
The doctrine of interspousal immunity was long understood as 
fundamental to marriage. Traditionally, "neither spouse could sue the other 
civilly for personal injuries wrongfully inflicted upon the other." 35 
Conferring such a right, it was feared, would be "destructive of that 
34 See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 488 (N.Y. Cty. 2005) (footnote and 
internal citations omitted): 
Marriage is no more limited by the historical exclusion of same-sex marriage than it was 
limited by the exclusion of interracial marriage, the legal doctrine of coverture, the pre-1967 
restrictions on remarriage following divorce in New York, longstanding restrictions on 
divorce, or the "marital exemption" to the crime of rape. 
Recent international developments show, too, that marriage continues to evolve 
without harm to the institution. Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Canada now recognize 
marriages of same-sex couples on the same basis as marriages of different-sex couples. See 
ABA SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex 
Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 F AM. L. Q. 339, 407-08 (2004) 
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER]; Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, para. 33, 
42 (Can.) (finding marriage rights for same-sex couples to be consistent with Canadian 
Charter and noting decisions from provincial courts mandating recognition of same-sex 
couples' marriages); Civil Marriage and the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Unions, 
http://canada.justice.gc.calenlfslssml (last updated July 21, 2005); Spain Makes Gay 
Marriages Legal, CNN, June 30, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.coml2005IWORLD/europel06/30/spain.gay.vote.ap/ index.html. 
Also, in 2004, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa found that exclusion 
of same-sex couples from common law marriage rights violated South Africa's Constitution. 
Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2005 (3) BCLR 241 (SCA) (S. Afr.). Nearly ten years 
earlier, Hungary's Constitutional Court recognized common-law marriages of same-sex 
couples. See WHITE PAPER, supra, at 410 (discussing 1995 ruling by Hungary's 
Constitutional Court recognizing common-law marriages of same-sex couples). 
35 People v. Morton, 284 A.D. 413,416 (2d Dep't), afJ'd, 308 N.Y. 96 (1954). 
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conjugal union and tranquility." 36 This immunity had widespread 
repercussions. For example, married women could not sue their husbands 
for assault and battery, 37 trespass upon their person, 38 malicious 
prosecution,39 or slander.40 
Eventually, however, this element of marriage that was once 
thought unalterable was written out of existence.41 In 1954, the Court of 
Appeals went further, extending the abrogation of interspousal immunity to 
include criminal cases so that a husband could be convicted of larceny for 
theft of his wife's property.42 In the Second Department's ruling in the same 
case, the Court observed that "[i]t would not be consonant with our present 
social concepts of husband and wife to say that one is not a person separate 
from the other .'.43 
New York courts similarly cast aside the longstanding rule that 
spouses could not be compelled to testify against each other in court.44 
b. Loss of Consortium 
As recently as 1958, the Court of Appeals sustained the deeply 
rooted traditional rule that husbands, but not wives, could recover for loss 
36 Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 366 (N.Y. Cty. 1863). 
37 See id.; Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N.Y. 644, rev'g63 How. Pro 181 (N.Y. Cty. 1882); 
Abbe V. Abbe, 22 A.D. 483 (2d Dep't 1897). 
38 Caplan V. Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445 (1935). 
39 Allen V. Allen, 246 N.Y. 571 (1927). 
40 Freethy V. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Cty. 1865). 
41 See Laws of 1937, ch. 669 § 1 (providing that spouses could sue each other for 
wrongful personal injuries); see also State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 35 N.Y.2d 
587,591 (1974) ("No longer is it considered contrary to public policy for one spouse to sue 
another for damages for personal injuries."). 
42 See People v. Morton, 308 N.Y. 96,99 (1954) ("We are not fearful, as was the 
court in 1863 ... that this will 'involve the husband and wife in perpetual controversy and 
litigation' or 'sow the seeds of perpetual discord and broil[.]"'). 
43 Morton, 284 A.D. at 418. 
44 See, e.g., People v. Watkins, 63 A.D.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Dep't 1978) (holding 
that the traditional privilege protecting spouses from testifying against each other "does not 
extend to communications between spouses" in connection with a criminal conspiracy) 
(internal quotations omitted); Peoplev. Smythe, 210 A.D.2d 887, 888 (4th Dep't 1994) 
(limiting spousal privilege). 
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of consortium.45 "The reason for this rule is that the wife at law is supposed 
to render services in and about the home and in caring for the children.'.46 
But ten years later, in Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co. ,47 the 
Court of Appeals rejected this traditional element of marriage, holding that 
"we ... remove the discrimination in the existing law by acknowledging the 
equal right of the wife to damages as a result of her loss of consortium.,,48 
Explaining its elimination of this once "venerable" element of marriage, the 
Court wrote that "'[t]he gist of the matter is that in today's society the 
wife's position is analogous to that of a partner, neither kitchen slattern nor 
upstairs maid. ".49 
c. Doctrine of Necessaries 
An additional, striking example of the fundamental changes to sex-
based distinctions in marriage arises in connection with the doctrine of 
necessaries, once viewed as "one of the most primary and absolute 
principles in New York law.,,50 Under the traditional rule, husbands, but not 
wives, were obligated to support the family.51 
In 1989, the Third Department recognized the outmoded nature of 
this common law rule, holding that spouses had reciprocal, rather than sex-
based, duties to pay for each other's necessaries. 52 In 1992, the Second 
Department agreed, holding that the gendered doctrine of necessaries 
violated the State's equal protection guarantee.53 
45 Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d 524, 527 (1958). 
46 Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 168 (1923). 
4722 N.Y.2d 498 (1968). 
48 /d. at 504. 
49Id. at 503, 508 (citation omitted); see also id. at 508-09 (stating that the old rule 
"'no longer expresses a standard of care which accords with the mores of our society"') 
(citation omitted). 
50 Med. Bus. Assoc., Inc. v. Steiner, 183 A.D.2d 86, 91 (2d Dep't 1992) (citations 
omitted). 
51 See Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 340 (1939) ("[T)he duty rests upon the 
husband to support his wife and his family, not merely to keep them from the poorhouse, but 
to support them in accordance with his station and position in life."); cf Med. Bus. Assoc., 
Inc., 183 A.D.2d at 91 (describing "[t]he obligation of a husband to support his wife" as 
"comport[ing] with the traditional family structure of the husband as sole breadwinner and 
the wife as full-time homemaker"). 
52 Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Frey, 152 A.D.2d 73 (3d Dep't 1989). 
53 See Med. Bus. Assoc., Inc., 183 A.D.2d at 91 (describing the traditional rule as 
"an anachronism that no longer fits contemporary society") (citations omitted). 
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d. Sexual Relations 
Finally, the treatment of sexual relations between spouses as an 
element of marriage has also undergone significant change. For over 150 
years, the law was clear: a man could have sexual relations with his wife 
any time he so chose. 54 Indeed, a wife's presumptive consent to sexual 
relations with her husband had long been considered fundamental to the 
marriage right.55 Yet in 1984, the Court of Appeals rejected this deep-rooted 
understanding of marriage. The traditional rationales for the marital rape 
exemption, it held, no longer withstood rational basis review. 56 
As the history of marriage demonstrates, fears that the institution of 
marriage would be endangered accompanied each change to elements once 
thought of as essential to marriage. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court observed, for example, that "[a]larms about the imminent erosion of 
the 'natural' order of marriage were sounded over the demise of 
antimiscegenation laws, the expansion of the rights of married women, and 
the introduction of 'no-fault divorce.",57 Yet, that court added, "[m]arriage 
has survived all of these transformations, and we have no doubt that 
marriage will continue to be a vibrant and revered institution. ,,58 The court 
below recognized this as well, noting the "steady evolution in the institution 
of marriage throughout history. ,,59 
The Court of Appeals made this same point regarding unfounded 
predictions of harm flowing from legal changes to familial relationships 
when it recognized tort liability between siblings in 1939. 60 The Court 
observed that "[t]he modem family ... is far different in structure, status 
and internal social and legal relationship than the family of ancient times.,,61 
It added: "Not withstanding such changes from tradition [to the rules 
governing family relations], predictions of dire results to the continued 
peace and amity of the family relationship have not been sustained.,,62 
54 People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 162 (1984) (citing an 1852 New York treatise 
on this point). 
55Id. 
56Id. at 163; see also People v. De Stefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113 (Suffolk Cty. 1983). 
57 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,967 (Mass. 2003). 
58Id. 
59 Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 489 (N.Y. Cty. 2005) (emphasis supplied). 
60 Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106 (1939). 
61 Id. at 109. 
62 Id. at III. 
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The historical record demonstrates, in short, that marriage has 
remained both viable and desirable as the State's most comprehensive 
formal mechanism for recognizing adult partnerships, even as its familiar, 
longstanding rules have been rejected over time. 
B. Spousal Interdependence Comprises the Essential Element of 
Marriage Today in New York; Alleged State Interests in the Sex of 
the Marriage Partners and Procreation Do Not Justify the Exclusion 
of Same-Sex Couples from Marriage. 
1. New York's Jurisprudence and Statutes Identify Interdependence as 
the Essence of Civil Marriage. 
On numerous occasions, New York's courts have identified the 
essence of marriage today not in the separate, gendered roles of husbands 
and wives nor in the function of procreation, but instead in the 
interdependence of the marital partners. This interdependence is, in large 
. 63 part, econOIDlC. 
Beyond economics, New York's courts have also recognized 
emotional interdependency and sexual intimacy as important to marriage. In 
addressing the concept of loss of consortium, for example, the Court of 
Appeals explained that the loss comprised not only "support or services" 
but also "such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual 
relations, solace and more.,,64 
The statutes governing marriage implicitly have recognized this 
concern with mutual care through their focus on insuring the consent of the 
parties to the marriage and on promoting the partners' commitment to each 
other.65 
63 See Holtennan v. Holtennan, 781 3 N.Y.3d 1, 7 (2004) (stating that the 
Domestic Relations Law "recognize[s] marriage as an economic partnership"); DeLuca v. 
DeLuca, 97 N.Y.2d 139, 144 (2001) (describing the "contemporary view of marriage as an 
economic partnership") (citations omitted); Koehler v. Koehler, 182 Misc. 2d 436, 442 
(Suffolk Cty. 1999) ("The underlying rationale of the reforms [to the Domestic Relations 
Law] of 1980 was the assumption that marriage was purely an economic partnership and 
should be treated as such."). 
64 Millington v. Se. Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498,502 (1968); see also Hernandez, 
7 Misc. 3d at 497 ("Marriage, as it is understood today, is both a partnership of two loving 
equals who choose to commit themselves to each other and a State institution designed to 
promote stability for the couple and their children."). 
65 See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 7(1)-(5) (McKinney 2004) (providing for 
nullification when a party to the marriage was incapable of consent or consent arose from 
force, duress, or fraud); N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 236(8)(6)(a)(5), (8) (McKinney 2004) 
(setting out conditions for maintenance awards based on one party having foregone 
opportunities or provided homemaking or other services for the other). 
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Likewise, the jurisprudence and statutory framework regarding 
divorce reinforce that interpersonal commitment is the linchpin of civil 
marriage. While divorce was once viewed as risking "the stability of our 
government".66 and "preced[ing] the downfall of a nation,,,67 contemporary 
law holds that society is better off when couples lacking interpersonal 
commitment do not remain married. As the Court of Appeals observed, 
New York divorce law today rests on a 
recognition that it is socially and morally undesirable to compel 
couples to a dead marriage to retain an illusory and deceptive 
status and that the best interests not only of the parties but of 
society itself will be furthered by enabling them "to extricate 
themselves from a perpetual state of marital limbo. ,,68 
2. The Rule Limiting Marriage to Men and Women Reflected an Earlier 
Era of Gendered Roles for Husbands and Wives; Current Law Does 
Not Treat the Sex Difference Between Marital Partners as Important 
or Relevant. 
The evolution of standards regarding care of children upon 
dissolution of a marriage reinforces that the sex of the marital partners has 
become legally irrelevant. The changes in this area-from a preference for 
fathers to a preference for mothers to a sex-neutral position-reveal the rule 
limiting marriage to male-female couples to be an outgrowth of an earlier 
view, since rejected, that marriage involved naturally and legally distinct 
roles for men and women. 
Early on in custody disputes, New York courts embraced the 
common law rule that the father, not the mother, was entitled to custody of 
their children. "That the father has, by the common law, the paramount 
right to the custody and control of his minor children, and to superintend 
their education and nurture, is too well settled to admit of doubt.,,69 Even 
after statutory changes in 1860 explicitly granted married women joint 
custody of their children,70 courts continued to find that "the recognized 
66 In re Estate of Lindgren, 181 Misc. 166,169 (Kings Cty. 1943). 
67 Id. at 170. 
68 Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 35 (1970) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
supplied); see also Halsey v. Halsey, 296 A.D.2d 28, 30 (2d Dep't 2002). 
69 People ex reI. Olmstead v. Olmstead, 27 Barb. 9,9 (N.Y. Cty. 1857); see also 
Linda R. v. Richard E., 162 A.D.2d 48, 54 n.3 (2d Dep't 1990) ("Gender had long been the 
primary factor in awarding custody, beginning with ancient and common-law doctrine of 
absolute patriarchal control .... "). 
70 See 1860 N.Y. Laws ch. 90 § 9. 
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paramount right of the father must prevail over the otherwise equal claims 
of the mother.,,71 
By the late 1800s, the absolute, seemingly "natural" rule favoring 
fathers gave way to a maternal presumption in child custody disputes, 
particularly when young children were involved.72 This maternal preference 
remained in force for much of the twentieth century.73 
More recently, though, the State's courts revisited this once-
"normal" preference for maternal care and concluded that sex-based 
parenting rules are outdated and not essential to marriage (or marital 
dissolution) after all. As the Second Department observed, "[w]hile the role 
of gender in making custody determinations has had a lengthy social and 
legal history, it finds no place in our current law.,,74 
New York's custody and child support statutes reflect the same 
gender-neutral position regarding the treatment of children upon marital 
dissolution. 75 As a result, courts now regularly award custody to fathers, 
even when both parents are found to be fit.76 
These shifts in custody rules and in the doctrine and law that 
constitute marriage underscore that conventional understandings, while not 
to be denigrated, cannot alone justify the continued enforcement of an 
otherwise discriminatory law or doctrine. As Justice Holmes remarked, 
dissenting in Lochner v. New York,77 "the accident of our finding certain 
opinions natural and familiar ... ought not to conclude our judgment upon 
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the 
71 People ex reI. Brooks v. Brooks, 35 Barb. 85, 92 (N.Y. ety. 1861). 
72 See Osterhoudt v. Osterhoudt, 28 Misc. 285, 285 (N.Y. ety. 1899) (explaining 
that "the tender guidance of a mother is of incalculable advantage, and should only be lost to 
[young children] by her death or misconduct"). 
73 See, e.g., People ex reI. Himber v. Himber, 136 N'y.S.2d 456, 458 (N.Y. ety. 
1954) ("[W]hen it becomes necessary to make a choice between mother and father it is to the 
child's best interest and welfare to be brought up and reared by his mother .... "). 
74 Linda R., 162 A.D.2d at 53-54; see also Fountain v. Fountain, 83 A.D.2d 694, 
694 (3d Dep't 1981) ("A presumption of 'maternal superiority' is now considered to be 
outdated."); cf Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 492-93 (N.Y. ety. 2005) (citing cases 
showing recognition by New York courts that "gay or lesbian sexual orientation does not 
bear on fitness to parent children"). 
75 See N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 70 (McKinney 2004) ("[i]n all cases there shall be no 
prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent"); N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 240(1) 
(McKinney 2004). 
76 See, e.g., Bryant v. Nazario, 306 A.D.2d 529 (2d Dep't 2003). 
77 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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Constitution of the United States.,,78 That is certainly the case here, where 
the different-sex eligibility requirement reflects the view of marriage as a 
gendered status that has long been rejected by both the courts and 
legislature. The present focus of both the courts and the legislature is now 
trained instead on the spouses' commitment to each other, a factor that has 
no legitimate connection to the sex of the marital partners. 
3. The Capacity to Procreate Has Never Been Treated as Essential to 
Marriage in New York. 
The history of marriage in New York as well as contemporary state 
law demonstrates that procreation has never been treated as an essential 
element of marriage. While references to the importance of procreation 
appear occasionally in dicta, it is the spouses' sexual relationship, and not 
their capacity or intent to procreate, that courts (and statutes) treat as 
fundamental to marriage. Indeed, the City's sole citation to support the 
proposition that marriage is '''for the purpose of begetting offspring",79 did 
not concern procreation at all. 80 Instead, at issue in Mirizio v. Mirizio was 
whether a wife was entitled to support when she refused to be sexually 
intimate with her husband after the husband failed to keep his promise to 
undergo a Catholic wedding ceremony.81 The court rejected her claim-not 
because procreation was essential to marriage, as the City suggests based on 
its acontextual excerpt from the case, but because the refusal of sexual 
intimacy constituted a violation of "the fundamental obligation of the 
marriage contract. ,,82 
In 1960, the Court of Appeals made the same point: that sexual 
intimacy, not procreation, is essential to marriage.83 In Diemer v. Diemer, 
the wife "unequivocally declared that she would not have any sexual 
78 [d. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The U.S. Supreme Court has taken this point 
to heart, affinning in numerous cases that while history is a useful starting point for analysis, 
the past alone cannot justify retention of a discriminatory, exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Pac. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 18 (1991) ('''[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor 
the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries insulates it 
from constitutional attack .... "') (alteration in original) (citation omitted); Walz v. Tax 
Cornrn'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) ("It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or 
protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time 
covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it."). 
79 Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74,81 (1926) (cited in Appellant's Br. at 45). 
80 Notably, the City's only argument on appeal concerns procreation; it appears to 
have abandoned its defense based on history, tradition, and uniformity made below. 
81 Mirizio, 242 N.Y. at 77, 84. 
82Id. at 81. 
83 Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206 (1960). 
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relations with her husband until they were remarried before a Roman 
Catholic priest." 84 Characterizing the refusal as "strik[ing] at the civil 
institution of marriage," 85 the Court granted the husband a decree of 
separation. In doing so, the Court reinforced that Mirizio concerned sexual 
intimacy rather than procreation: "That a refusal to have marital sexual 
relations undennines the essential structure of marriage is a proposition 
basic to this court's decision in the Mirizio case and as obvious as it is 
authoritative. ,,86 
The State's annulment statutes and jurisprudence confinn that 
procreation has been neither necessary nor sufficient to marriage. Over a 
century ago, the Second Department distinguished sexual relations from 
procreation, finding that the inability to "become a mother" did not make it 
"impossible for the defendant ... to enter into the marriage state.,,87 "[I]t 
cannot be held, as a matter of law, that the possession of the organs 
necessary to conception are essential to entrance to the marriage state, so 
long as there is no impediment to the indulgence of the passions incident to 
this state."S8 Simply put, sexual relations, not procreation, was a foundation 
of marriage. 
In Zagarow v. Zagarow,89 the court likewise held that a wife's 
refusal to procreate was not a ground for divorce. "Unlike marital sexual 
relations, which are, per se, part of the essential structure of marriage, the 
parties are free to decide when and if and how often they will have 
children," the court wrote.90 
Even the Domestic Relations Law provision that "physical cause" 
can render a marriage voidable91 relates not to procreation but rather to the 
capacity for sexual intimacy. The Court of Appeals made this clear in 1930, 
when it distinguished the ability to bear children from the ability to 
"perfonn[] the functions of a wife or a husband.',92 
84 Id. at 209. 
85 Id. at 210. 
86 Id. 
87 Wendel v. Wendel, 30 A.D. 447,448-49 (2d Dep't 1898) (citations omitted). 
88 Id. at 449. 
89 105 Misc. 2d 1054 (Suffolk Cty. 1980). 
90 Id. at 1057; see also id. at 1059 ("It would be futile to rule that a woman must 
submit to a pregnancy and then hold that she may legally abort it."); People v. De Stefano, 
121 Misc. 2d 113, 123 (Suffolk Cty. 1983). 
91 N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 7(3) (McKinney 1909). 
92 Lapides v. Lapides, 254 N.Y. 73, 80 (1930) (observing that "[t]he inability to 
bear children is not such a physical incapacity as justifies an annulment"); see also 
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) ("While it is certainly 
HeinOnline -- 15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 270 2006
270 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol. 15:1 
As the history and current law regarding the elements of marriage 
demonstrate, neither procreation nor gendered roles for the marital partners 
is essential to marriage today. Instead, taken together, they reveal the 
different-sex eligibility rule to be inconsistent with the standards of 
marriage as they have evolved. 
C. New York Historically Has Not Maintained Uniformity With Other 
States in Its Definition of Marriage. 
Throughout history, New York has always followed its own course 
in defining and transforming the elements of marriage in the ways discussed 
above. Indeed, the State has not sought uniformity with other states' 
marriage laws either through its marriage statutes or through the liberal 
comity principles by which it has traditionally and voluntarily recognized 
other states' marriages. The State's history thus contradicts the City's claim, 
as made to the trial COurt,93 that the status of marriage in other states should 
govern New York law. 
New York's comity law, which reflects the State's autonomous 
decision to recognize virtually all marriages that are valid where they are 
celebrated, has led to recognition of marriages that the State's own law does 
not perrnit. 94 For example, New York's courts have recognized common 
law marriages, marriages between an uncle and a niece, and remarriage by 
an adulterer, among others.95 
true that many, perhaps most, married couples have children together (assisted or unassisted), 
it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not 
the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage."); William M. 
Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Ma"iage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J. 1495, 1512 
(1994) ("[L]aws governing domestic relations do not treat the ability to procreate as a 
precondition of marriage. The marital relationship is valued in its own right as a legal 
commitment between two intimately related adults, not because it is sometimes connected 
with procreation."); cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(stating that "encouragement of procreation" could not justify excluding same-sex couples 
from marriage). 
93 See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 483-86 (N.Y. Cty. 2005) (analyzing 
and rejecting the City's argument regarding "consistency with Federal Law and Other 
States"). 
94 See In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486,490 (1953) (stating that "the legality of a 
marriage between persons. .. is to be determined by the law of the place where it is 
celebrated"). 
95 See, e.g., Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Transp., 51 N.Y.2d 289, 292 (1980) ("[I]t 
has long been settled law that although New York does not itself recognize common-law 
marriages ... a common-law marriage contracted in a sister State will be recognized as valid 
here if it is valid where contracted."); In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. at 492-93 (recognizing 
the out-of-state marriage of an uncle and a niece, despite the State's prohibition of such 
marriages); Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18 (1881) (recognizing remarriage of man 
who traveled out of state to evade New York's prohibition against remarriage). 
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The State's generous comity doctrine also has led New York to 
recognize same-sex couples' marriages and partnerships celebrated out of 
state.96 New York City itself has acknowledged that it will accord full legal 
respect to marriages of same-sex couples entered out of state.97 
The only exceptions that New York courts have suggested could 
prevent the recognition of a valid out-of-state marriage are "cases, first of 
incest or polygamy coming within the prohibitions of natural law. .. ; 
second, of prohibition by positive law.',98 The Court of Appeals has stressed, 
further, that foreign-based rights should be enforced unless the transaction 
"is inherently 'vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing 
moral sense.,,99 
Just as New York's liberal treatment of out-of-state marriages 
illustrates the State's willingness to maintain marriage law that is not 
uniform with other states, so too New York's relatively conservative 
divorce law shows the State's lack of commitment to uniformity. In the 
nineteenth century, the State's divorce laws were "notorious for their 
rigidity and inflexibility."too As "the last state to move toward liberalizing 
its divorce laws,,,tOt New York banned remarriage by the party liable for the 
divorce during much of the nineteenth century t02 and until 1966 had 
adultery as its only ground for divorce. t03 Even today, New York remains 
differently situated from other states with respect to divorce. It is now the 
96 See, e.g., Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 196 Misc. 2d 440 (Nassau Cty. 
2003) (treating gay couple with Vennont civil union as spouses for purposes of wrongful 
death statute); 2004 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. No. I (2004) (stating that state comity law would 
require recognition of same-sex couples' out-of-state marriages). 
97 Letter from Anthony Crowell, Special Counsel to the Mayor, City of New York, 
to Alan Van Capelle, Executive Director, Empire State Pride Agenda (Apr. 6, 200S), 
http://www.prideagenda.orglpdfslNYC Letter Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage.pdf. 
98 Van Voorhis, 86 N.Y. at 26. With respect to consanguinity, New York remains 
in the minority of states that continue to recognize marriages between first cousins. See 
JUDITH C. AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (4th ed. 1999). 
99 Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (puerto Rico) v. Golden, IS N.Y.2d 9,13 (1964). 
100 Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital Expectations in Nineteenth Century 
America, 80 GEO. LJ. 9S, 116 (1991). 
101 Marcus, supra note 13, at 417 n.IS9. 
102 Laws of 1879, ch. 321 § 49. 
103 N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 170 (McKinney 1966) (amending state law to provide 
six grounds for divorce, including, inter alia, abandonment and separation pursuant to court 
order or written agreement). 
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only state in the country to "require[] the finding of fault or living apart 
pursuant to a legal document as a basis for divorce."I04 
Thus, neither historically nor today can New York's marriage law 
be characterized fairly as conforming with that of other states. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As illustrated above, the history of marriage has been one of 
evolution, not of static immutability, with marriage surviving innumerable 
changes to its core rules over the last two centuries. These changes to the 
institution of marriage over time have rendered the current rule excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage inconsistent with New York law, which 
has both repudiated gendered marriage rules as unconstitutional and, 
historically as well as contemporarily, not held procreation to be an 
essential element of marriage. The City's gender- and procreation-related 
defenses thus lack any legitimate relationship to the concerns of equality 
and interdependence that are marriage's now-settled underpinnings. 
Likewise, the historical and ongoing absence of uniformity between 
marriage rules of New York and other states demonstrates that claims about 
uniformity cannot support the rule challenged here. 
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